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John Carpenter, film director of horror movies such as Halloween, was once asked what
he thought it was that scared theater audiences the most. His answer was simple:
“Uncertainty.” Carpenter understood that not knowing what will happen next often
produces more anxiety and angst than actual traumatic events. As anyone who has sat on
the edge of their chair during thrillers such as Psycho or Jaws understands, it’s the
apprehension and dread resulting from uncertainty that exacts the most psychological toll
from viewers.
Unfortunately, today’s Army finds itself reading from a script saturated with
uncertainty. For a force accustomed to the draining yet preordained forecasts of the
“Patch Chart” and the frenetic yet predictable pace of the ARFORGEN cycle, the end of
the war in Afghanistan signals the beginning of a journey into the unknown.
Soldiers—many of whom have known nothing but the Groundhog Day routine of
deploying or preparing to deploy—now find themselves in an Army with undefined
budgetary conditions and a still evolving mission.
Looming large over the entire situation, however, is the specter of the Army’s
impending downsizing driven by the curtailed demand for troops in Afghanistan and
accelerated by a nation anxious to spend its treasure on more pressing domestic concerns.
The inevitable downsizing will result in the reduction of the active duty rolls from an
Army of 570,000 to a force of 490,000 (or less, according to murmurings in the
blogosphere) by the end of fiscal year 2017.
Of course, the Army has already been down this path many times before, so executing
a downsizing should almost be routine by now. For example, the Army’s active duty end
strength after the Vietnam War dropped from 1.5 million to about 780,000 in a little over
5 years. But that force reduction included the momentous shift from a conscripted force
to an all-volunteer Army. And one would be hard pressed to find anyone who would claim
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that the post-Vietnam downsizing—typified by insensitive dismissals of combat veterans
via pink slips accompanied by almost nonexistent transition assistance—is an example of
a well-executed reduction in force.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the Army once again
reduced its size during the early 1990s, going from 780,000 soldiers to 480,000. During
that downsizing, the Army deliberately endeavored to avoid the pitfalls and blunders of
the post-Vietnam force reductions. For example, instead of summarily dismissing officers,
the Army expended significant energy minimizing the use of involuntary separation
programs, while heavily promoting a variety of more compassionate (and expensive)
voluntary separation options. Additionally, the Army took great pains to provide
assistance to those transitioning out of the force by fielding programs offering job
placement and career counseling.
While the post-Cold War downsizing served to exorcise many of the demons of the
painful post-Vietnam experience, it should be noted that the cutbacks of the 1990s were
executed in an environment much different than today’s situation. For example, in 1995
the unemployment rate was 5.5% compared to a 7.7% jobless rate today. Additionally,
with the once-thought-impossible sequester now a reality, the probability of additional,
and even deeper, cuts in defense spending seems not so unlikely. Across the world,
incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan reveal that global unrest continues to simmer, while
tensions involving North Korea, Iran, and Syria add to worldwide instability. In other
words, the current downsizing will be implemented in a much more acutely unsure and
uncertain environment.
In such a time of flux and volatility, it is imperative that the Army redouble its efforts
to diminish the uncertainty associated with the downsizing. To be sure, much of the
uncertainty originates from decisions (or indecision) outside the Army and is therefore
inevitable and unavoidable. Nevertheless, there are some overarching principles that can
guide the Army’s efforts in minimizing the impact of uncertainty during the force
reduction.
First, the Army must publish its downsizing plan as soon as possible to include
specifying target reduction numbers, as well as describing the programs designed to
entice, encourage, or compel Soldiers to leave the service. A detailed plan allows those
who desire to stay to know when the risk of being downsized has passed, and it gives
those who are thinking of leaving an improved ability to assess their options. More
importantly, a thorough and transparent plan shows the entire force that the Army is
engaged, proactive, and rational despite the fog of uncertainty surrounding the
downsizing.
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Second—and this is particularly crucial for the officer corps—the Army must identify
those who are at risk and those who are the top talent. For too long, perfunctory
promotion boards and inflated performance appraisals have conveyed the impression that
every officer is above average. In these days, the Army must be brutally honest in
communicating to officers where they stand in relation to their peers. No involuntarily
separated officer should say that they were not warned that they were at risk for
separation. Likewise, the Army should identify and doggedly pursue the most talented
officers for retention. Note that the process of ensuring that each officer is aware of their
relative position in their cohort can occur before the final downsizing plan is in place.
Third, as Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently pointed out, the downsizing is not
only an occasion to understand the challenges and uncertainties associated with a
reduction in force, but to also recognize the opportunities inherent in budget constraints.
In other words, if the Army is going to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific theater, bolster cyber
warfare capabilities, or strive to produce more strategically thinking senior leaders, then
the downsizing is an opportune time to adjust force structure and shape the Army’s talent
toward those ends. In other words, the downsizing is more than just shrinking the size of
the Army. It is also a chance to thoughtfully reestablish priorities and judiciously refocus
now limited resources.
Finally, the downsizing must result from the concerted efforts of both the Army
bureaucracy and the Army profession. The Army bureaucracy will efficiently reduce the
Army’s financial footprint while maintaining adequate levels of combat readiness. It is the
Army bureaucracy that will carefully balance end strength and force structure within
directed fiscal constraints. Additionally, it is the Army bureaucracy that will devise the
myriad programs to eventually execute the force reductions.
However, it is the Army profession that will ensure that downsizing programs are
carried out with meticulous care and compassion. It is the Army profession that will rally
around those encouraged or induced to leave—including their families—and offer
generous assistance in the transition to civilian life. It will also be the Army profession
that clearly understands that the manner in which the Army conducts the downsizing will
affect not only those who leave, but also those who remain; American society will also be
curious to see if the Army really never leaves a fallen comrade behind.
The Army has made great strides reestablishing itself as a profession during a decade
of war. Ultimately, the swirling uncertainty surrounding the downsizing can only be
mitigated by, once again, the Army profession taking care of its own, thus continuing to
earn the trust of both its Soldiers and the society it serves.
*****
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